The debate over whether the United States should sell F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia has quickly evolved into a far broader and far more serious conversation—one centered not only on Middle Eastern foreign policy or regional military balance, but on the urgent threat posed by China’s relentless campaign to steal American defense technology. Recent public statements by retired military leaders, cybersecurity experts, and China analysts reveal a growing alarm that Beijing is already attempting to obtain the most advanced American military aircraft data through espionage, cyber theft, and technological exploitation. As the United States weighs a major arms deal with Saudi Arabia, national security voices are warning that the Chinese Communist Party views the F-35 as a prime target and has a long history of exploiting access to U.S. technology through third-country channels. Understanding this risk is essential, not only because of the Saudi defense relationship debate, but because the F-35 represents one of the most strategically important weapons systems the United States possesses.
Retired Gen. Charles Wald, former deputy commander of U.S. European Command, reminded policymakers that both the United Arab Emirates and Turkey were previously denied access to the F-35 due to concerns that China could gain insight into the aircraft’s technology. Wald argued that similar risks apply to Saudi Arabia, not because Riyadh would intentionally transfer secrets, but because China already runs aggressive intelligence operations designed to quietly extract classified information. Wald stated that Beijing has demonstrated the capability to penetrate foreign military environments, meaning the concern lies not with the Saudi military itself but with China’s proven expertise in exploiting weaknesses in partner networks. His comments underscore the reality that modern defense threats no longer operate only through intentional cooperation. In the 21st century, espionage frequently takes the shape of infiltrating infrastructure, inserting compromised software or hardware, and targeting individuals with access to sensitive systems.
China specialist Gordon Chang goes even further, warning that Beijing has already stolen massive amounts of data related to the F-35 program and should be expected to attempt additional penetrations. Chang noted that China used cyber theft and industrial espionage to acquire design components that contributed to the development of its J-20 stealth fighter. According to Chang, China’s intelligence services have spent decades targeting American aerospace technology, and history demonstrates that Beijing aggressively leverages every possible opportunity to gain strategic advantage. In his view, the United States should assume broad Chinese access attempts—especially when high-value defense assets become part of wider diplomatic negotiations. The question is not whether China is trying to steal, but how far it has already succeeded.
If China were to gain enhanced access to F-35 technology, the consequences for the United States would be profound. The strength of the F-35 platform lies not only in its stealth capabilities and weapons systems but in its advanced sensors, battlefield networking, and real-time data integration architecture. A single vulnerability could undermine the ability of American pilots to operate safely and compromise the power of coalition operations around the world. If adversaries were able to decode communication systems, radar signatures, or data-fusion capabilities, they could develop counter-weapons that neutralize U.S. air superiority—an outcome that would fundamentally alter global deterrence structures. That possibility is not theoretical. China has already invested heavily in hypersonic missiles, electronic warfare systems, and next-generation air defenses explicitly designed to challenge U.S. aircraft dominance.
Retired Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, acknowledged that the United States maintains end-use monitoring systems designed to track how weapons sold abroad are handled. However, he admitted that no supervision mechanism is absolute. The reality of digital espionage means adversaries often do not need physical possession of equipment to harvest classified data. The threat today is not a transfer of hardware across borders but invisible infiltration through cyber channels. This is exactly where China has excelled, and it is why national security experts are raising alarms around even hypothetical access points.
Beijing’s record underscores the concern. Chinese intelligence has been linked to cyber intrusions targeting the F-35 program for more than a decade, stealing engineering data and classified design information that analysts believe contributed directly to the shape and radar-absorption features of China’s J-20 stealth fighter. U.S. officials have repeatedly attributed these breaches to state-backed hacking groups specializing in aerospace espionage. China’s strategy relies on obtaining cutting-edge technology without investing equivalent resources in innovation. It is a shortcut approach that accelerates military advancement while shifting the burden and cost of research onto the United States.
Within this context, the debate about Saudi Arabia’s access to the F-35 cannot be separated from China’s wider technological ambitions. Beijing views global weapons sales not as isolated transactions but as opportunities to expand influence, collect intelligence, and weaken competitors. China’s economic engagement throughout the Middle East, including growing partnerships in digital infrastructure and telecommunications, creates the possibility that Chinese technology embedded in regional networks could serve as a pathway to defense exploitation. While the retired commanders speak cautiously about Saudi Arabia’s trustworthiness, they make clear that China’s reach is increasingly difficult to contain.
This is why the United States must exercise strategic awareness. It is possible to strengthen alliances, support regional stability, and pursue diplomatic breakthroughs with partners like Riyadh while simultaneously recognizing the urgency of protecting America’s most sensitive defense capabilities. National security is not at odds with diplomacy; it is the foundation that ensures partnerships endure on terms favorable to democratic interests. And while the retired commanders express confidence that Israel’s qualitative military edge will remain intact regardless of F-35 sales, the broader concern involves China’s attempt to tilt the global balance of power through covert technological acquisition.
The stakes of this debate extend far beyond one aircraft contract. Advanced weapons systems, cyber warfare tools, AI-driven defense platforms, and network integration architectures form the backbone of U.S. global deterrence. If China can weaken or replicate them, the consequences reach every corner of American national security—from Indo-Pacific stability to NATO readiness. Beijing’s strategic goal is not cooperation but advantage. It seeks to reshape power structures, diminish American influence, and project military strength through technological superiority.
Protecting American innovation means recognizing the scale of the threat. China’s aggressive pursuit of U.S. defense secrets is not speculation; it is documented history. And in a world in which conflict increasingly unfolds in the digital and technological arenas, the integrity of systems like the F-35 determines whether the United States maintains its ability to deter adversaries and protect allies. This moment demands vigilance, not complacency.
The question facing Americans today is not simply whether to sell a jet to a partner nation, but how to secure the future of American military dominance in an era of unprecedented technological espionage. Failing to confront the scale and sophistication of China’s strategy could cost far more than a fighter aircraft—it could endanger the stability that keeps global conflict in check. The United States must understand that safeguarding defense innovation is not just policy; it is national survival.
