Chinese LiDAR in U.S. Infrastructure Sparks Alarming Security Fears as New Bill Seeks to Halt Beijing’s Technological Influence
A new bill introduced in Congress has brought national attention to a troubling vulnerability buried deep inside America’s rapidly expanding autonomous technology landscape. Chinese-made LiDAR sensors—critical systems used in self-driving cars, robotics, military prototypes and even port operations—have quietly gained overwhelming dominance across global markets. Now, U.S. lawmakers and national security experts warn that these sensors represent far more than competitive hardware. They could serve as a direct avenue for Chinese interference, surveillance, or even sabotage of American infrastructure. The proposal to phase out these systems marks a pivotal moment in the nation’s effort to prevent foreign adversaries from embedding themselves inside the technological core of U.S. transportation, energy and defense networks.
Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi of Illinois, the ranking member of the House Select Committee on China, introduced legislation targeting Chinese LiDAR systems after growing intelligence assessments suggested the technology could be remotely disabled during a conflict. Analysts fear that China could exploit its control over firmware, software updates or satellite-linked kill-switches to disable these sensors across thousands of vehicles and infrastructure assets simultaneously. Such an attack would not simply disrupt traffic; it could paralyze portions of America’s transportation grid, interrupt port operations, ground autonomous military vehicles and destabilize critical industries that increasingly rely on automated inspection and navigation. The idea that a foreign country could immobilize U.S. systems within seconds is no longer viewed as a fictional scenario. It is now a national concern.
What makes the issue even more alarming is the sheer level of Chinese dominance in the LiDAR market. Industry research by Yole Group shows that Chinese companies hold 93 percent of the global market for passenger vehicle LiDAR and 89 percent of the overall LiDAR industry. The world’s largest automotive LiDAR manufacturer, Hesai Group, has already been identified by the U.S. Department of Defense as an entity supporting China’s military apparatus. While Hesai challenged this designation in court, it lost—cementing the Pentagon’s position that the company poses an unacceptable security risk. This concentration of market power gives Beijing not only economic leverage but also potential strategic leverage in any future geopolitical standoff.
The bill proposed in Congress is designed to introduce a controlled, phased transition away from Chinese-made components. Under the legislation, new purchases of Chinese LiDAR systems would be prohibited after three years. Existing critical infrastructure that relies on Chinese equipment would have up to five years to complete a transition. The legislation also includes limited waivers for scientific research, ensuring that U.S. innovation is not hindered during the transition period. These measured provisions show an understanding that the solution is not to disrupt American industries overnight, but to create a clear and reasonable pathway toward securing the technology that underpins the country’s future mobility and defense systems.
Experts emphasize that allowing China to deepen its presence in America’s autonomous technology ecosystem could create vulnerabilities eerily similar to those identified in the debate over Huawei’s telecommunications equipment. Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, warns that the country may be heading toward a “Huawei-on-wheels” crisis. If LiDAR sensors—embedded in cars, drones, pipeline inspection robots, port equipment and military vehicles—can be remotely compromised, then Beijing could gain unprecedented influence over physical and digital infrastructure. Such leverage could be exploited in times of political tension, conflict or coercion, giving China a strategic advantage without ever deploying a single missile or hacking into a governmental network.
Moreover, the proliferation of Chinese LiDAR components poses a challenge not only to national security but also to technological sovereignty. While American firms such as Ouster and Aeva Technologies are working aggressively to win automaker contracts, they face an uphill battle against subsidized Chinese competitors whose pricing strategies undercut the market. Over time, the dominance of these foreign suppliers risks hollowing out domestic innovation and weakening the U.S. industrial base. If America becomes dependent on Chinese hardware for its next generation of autonomous technology, it may unknowingly concede strategic industries that will shape the global economy and warfare of the next century.
The threat is not limited to transportation. Autonomous systems are becoming integral to energy infrastructure, agriculture, border patrol, disaster response, and commercial logistics. LiDAR sensors are the “eyes” of these systems. If those eyes belong to companies aligned with the Chinese state, the United States may inadvertently allow foreign adversaries to watch through them or, worse, shut them off at will. In a world where data is central to both economic competition and military preparedness, the risk is simply too great to ignore. The potential for remote manipulation or programmed failure is not science fiction. It is a plausible threat documented in multiple national security analyses.
The legislative push also highlights a broader trend: China’s strategic use of commercial technologies to expand its geopolitical influence. Beijing understands that control of critical supply chains—especially in advanced technology—can provide leverage equal to or greater than traditional military assets. By dominating the market for sensors that power autonomous machines, China positions itself at the center of future industries. This dominance is not accidental; it reflects decades of state-backed investment, subsidies and coordinated industrial policies designed to outpace Western competitors and establish long-term technological dependence.
Meanwhile, the United States faces a stark reality: even though it leads the world in many forms of innovation, it cannot assume that leadership will translate automatically into secure strategic supply chains. The emergence of Chinese LiDAR components across American cars, ports and robotics systems shows how easily foreign technologies can become embedded before policymakers fully grasp the implications. The new bill serves as a corrective step—one that aims to prevent deeper technological entanglement before the vulnerabilities become irreversible.
At its core, this issue is about safeguarding the integrity of systems that millions of Americans rely on every day. Self-driving cars may seem like a futuristic convenience, but the technology behind them is already flowing into essential sectors far removed from consumer transportation. If the United States allows adversarial nations to dominate the sensors at the heart of these systems, it risks opening the door to future crises triggered not by visible attacks but by silent digital switches embedded within hardware.
LiDAR security is no longer a theoretical discussion. It is part of a broader effort to ensure that America’s technological foundation remains free from foreign control or interference. The bill introduced in Congress sends an unmistakable message: the United States must act now to prevent China from gaining a strategic foothold in the infrastructure that will define its mobility, commerce and national defense. As autonomous systems continue to expand into every corner of modern life, the nation must ensure that the technologies guiding them are safe, reliable and free from geopolitical manipulation.
Understanding the risks associated with Chinese LiDAR is essential for every American. These sensors are not just components in a vehicle—they are potential gateways for foreign influence. Recognizing the danger is the first step toward building secure, resilient and independent technological systems. The next step is ensuring that policies, industries and the public remain vigilant about the vulnerabilities that accompany foreign-made critical technologies. The United States cannot afford to underestimate the strategic implications of allowing adversarial nations to control essential parts of its future.
