Canada’s Failure to Expel Chinese Spies Raises Red Flags for the U.S., Underscoring a Growing National Security Threat
Canada’s reluctance to expel Chinese intelligence operatives working on its soil has generated alarm far beyond Ottawa. According to testimony before Canada’s House of Commons by China scholar Charles Burton, the country’s ongoing tolerance of Beijing-linked espionage has sent a troubling message to the international community: Canada may be an “open territory” for Chinese infiltration. While the warning was directed at Canadian lawmakers, the implications extend directly to the United States, which relies heavily on its northern ally for security cooperation, joint intelligence, military coordination, and shared continental defense. When China identifies weak links in the security frameworks of U.S. partners, the consequences inevitably flow across the border.
Burton’s testimony is particularly notable because it highlights a long-standing pattern. Canada has known for years that Chinese intelligence networks operate within its borders—monitoring dissidents, targeting politicians, intimidating Chinese-Canadian communities, and using diplomatic cover to build pathways of influence. Yet very few Chinese officials have ever been expelled, even in cases where Western intelligence agencies have publicly flagged their activities. Burton pointed to the expulsion of Chinese diplomat Zhao Wei in 2023, but emphasized that action occurred only after media exposés made the situation politically untenable. For most Chinese operatives identified by CSIS—the Canadian Security Intelligence Service—no such consequences have followed. The silence, he warned, emboldens Beijing and signals weakness at a time when authoritarian states are aggressively expanding their influence operations.
For the United States, which cooperates with Canada through NORAD, the Five Eyes alliance, and joint border security frameworks, this vulnerability creates a direct national-security concern. When one member of an intelligence-sharing alliance is compromised, all members are exposed. Burton stressed that Washington may increasingly question whether Canada can be trusted to handle sensitive information or counteract foreign interference effectively. This uncertainty creates operational risk, especially as China continues to expand its global espionage footprint, deepen cyber intrusions, and weaponize diaspora communities for political leverage. A permissive environment in Canada becomes an access point—one step removed from U.S. institutions, government agencies, and defense infrastructure.
Burton also drew attention to China’s unusually large diplomatic presence in Canada. With 176 accredited Chinese diplomats—far outnumbering the personnel of Japan, India, or European allies—the imbalance raises serious questions about the true purpose of Beijing’s presence. Burton questioned whether legitimate diplomatic duties require such a footprint, or whether as much as seventy percent of the staffing is devoted to intelligence activities, political influence, harassment of dissidents, and operations inconsistent with diplomatic norms. For American observers, this detail is a stark reminder of how Beijing uses consulates and embassies as hubs for both overt and covert coercive activities, including operations that directly impact U.S. political stability and Chinese-American communities.
The issue is not limited to expelled spies—or the lack of expulsions. Canada’s stalled implementation of its foreign influence registry, passed in 2024 but still not operational, has raised further doubts. Burton criticized the unexplained delays in appointing a transparency commissioner, describing the process as “cynical stakeholder management” rather than sincere action against foreign interference. The failure to name a commissioner, he argued, appears to reflect institutional resistance or hidden pressure from political figures who may fear a registry revealing questionable ties to foreign entities. For the United States, a delayed registry means Chinese influence networks continue to operate freely in North America, exploiting gaps in transparency and enforcement.
This concern is particularly acute given the broader geopolitical climate. China’s infiltration campaigns have targeted academic institutions, technology firms, diaspora communities, and political systems across the West. America has faced similar challenges—from covert police stations operating in U.S. cities to coordinated online disinformation and attempts to compromise local officials. When China recognizes that a neighboring country is not enforcing counterintelligence protections, it gains a strategic advantage. Canada’s openness becomes Beijing’s gateway for a softer entry into U.S. political, economic, and civil institutions. The shared border, deep economic integration, and close social ties make this a uniquely convenient route for long-term influence operations.
The testimony also raised concerns about Canada’s broader diplomatic posture. Despite Canada’s acknowledgement that China is increasingly assertive—and despite Beijing’s detention of Canadian citizens in retaliation for past legal actions—Prime Minister Mark Carney recently described the relationship as entering a “turning point,” opening the door to more business opportunities. Similarly, Canada’s foreign minister referred to the bilateral relationship as a “strategic partnership,” even though Ottawa’s own Indo-Pacific strategy describes China as a disruptive power that threatens global stability and undermines the rules-based order. Burton argued that such statements risk aligning Canada too closely with Beijing’s preferred framework, weakening North America’s collective resilience at a time when China has intensified its global authoritarian outreach.
For the United States, Burton’s testimony serves as an urgent reminder that Chinese influence operations do not recognize national boundaries. When an allied nation tolerates infiltration, fails to expel spies, delays transparency measures, or downplays political interference, Beijing expands its sphere of influence without firing a shot. America’s national security depends on the vigilance of its closest partners, and the stability of the U.S.–Canada security relationship requires both countries to align on countering authoritarian coercion. In an era where espionage extends from cyber networks to diaspora communities and from diplomatic posts to economic partnerships, weakness in one jurisdiction becomes a vulnerability for an entire region.
What happens in Canada does not stay in Canada. As China increases its intelligence presence across North America, the United States must monitor how Beijing exploits political gaps, regulatory delays, and diplomatic imbalances in allied countries. Burton’s testimony reveals that China sees opportunity in hesitation, ambiguity, and inaction. The U.S. cannot afford to ignore signals that a close ally may be struggling to counter one of the world’s most aggressive expansionist intelligence apparatuses. Strengthening collective defense—and ensuring that no member of the Five Eyes alliance becomes an entry point for authoritarian influence—will be essential to protecting American institutions, communities, and democratic stability in the years ahead.
