
Why Xi Jinping’s Laughter Is Censored in China — And What It Reveals About Beijing’s Global Threat to Free Expression
When the White House released photographs showing Chinese President Xi Jinping smiling and laughing alongside U.S. President Donald Trump at their recent APEC meeting in Busan, the images quickly made headlines in Western media. They captured a rare moment of levity from one of the world’s most secretive and tightly controlled leaders. But inside China, those same photos will never appear on social media, television, or newspapers. Within minutes of publication abroad, Chinese censors ensured they were wiped clean from domestic platforms.
The reason is simple yet deeply revealing: in China, even the image of Xi Jinping laughing must conform to state doctrine. His public persona is carefully constructed as a symbol of discipline, authority, and ideological infallibility. A spontaneous smile — especially one caught on camera during a meeting with a foreign leader — risks exposing a more human, fallible side of a man the Communist Party has elevated to near-mythic status. And behind that act of erasure lies a larger truth: Beijing’s obsession with information control is not merely about optics — it’s about power.
The now-suppressed photos from the White House depict Xi Jinping grinning broadly, even closing his eyes in laughter as Trump points to a document on the table. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is seen smiling beside him. It was, by any normal diplomatic standard, an unremarkable moment — two world leaders sharing a brief, lighthearted exchange. But in Xi’s China, nothing about the leader’s image is allowed to appear unplanned.
The Chinese propaganda machine has spent over a decade cultivating an image of Xi as a stoic guardian of national destiny. State media photos of him are meticulously curated: he appears strong, unsmiling, and almost mythological, whether inspecting troops, visiting factories, or presiding over Communist Party congresses. Laughter disrupts that mythology. It humanizes him — and to Beijing’s propagandists, humanization means vulnerability.
So when the White House press office published the pictures, censors at Weibo, Douyin, and Xiaohongshu — China’s equivalents of Twitter, TikTok, and Instagram — immediately moved to suppress them. Searches for Xi’s name returned “no results.” Posts containing screenshots were deleted. Even state-run outlets like Xinhua News and CCTV avoided mentioning the images altogether. The regime could not risk millions of Chinese citizens seeing their leader laugh freely in a foreign country — especially alongside a U.S. president.
The suppression of a smile might seem trivial, but in authoritarian systems, it reflects something far more profound: control over narrative equals control over reality. In Xi’s China, the government dictates not only what citizens say but also what they see, what they remember, and what emotions they are allowed to associate with their leaders.
Since consolidating power, Xi has tightened the digital firewall that separates China from the rest of the internet. Western social media platforms remain banned. Independent journalism has been dismantled. Artificial intelligence algorithms now automatically detect and erase “unapproved” content, while police arrest citizens for private group chats deemed politically sensitive. The result is a self-contained information ecosystem where Xi’s image is omnipresent yet artificial — endlessly replicated, never spontaneous.
The irony is that Xi’s censorship policies, while aimed at maintaining domestic stability, are also becoming tools of international influence. Through companies like TikTok’s parent firm ByteDance, Huawei, and other state-affiliated tech entities, Beijing exports the same censorship principles abroad — embedding them into apps, infrastructure, and digital platforms that millions of Americans use every day. What China tests at home, it later deploys abroad under the guise of commerce and connectivity.
The erasure of Xi’s laughter reveals how Beijing sees information not as a public resource but as a weapon of governance. To the Communist Party, the leader’s facial expression is part of national security. Every photo, every headline, every post must reinforce the illusion of unity and strength. Anything less risks being perceived as weakness — both to citizens and to the outside world.
This logic explains why Beijing spends billions of dollars funding state-run media operations like CGTN and China Daily to promote sanitized narratives overseas. It explains why Chinese diplomats, now nicknamed “wolf warriors,” flood social platforms with nationalist propaganda. And it explains why China reacts so aggressively to foreign criticism: any loss of narrative control is treated as an existential threat to regime stability.
When foreign governments or media highlight images that humanize Xi or question his authority, Beijing interprets it as subversion. This is the same mentality that drives censorship of domestic dissent, from Tiananmen commemoration bans to the mass detention of journalists and human rights lawyers. The suppression of a laugh may seem harmless, but it comes from the same system that imprisons writers for a poem or deletes online posts mourning earthquake victims.
Americans might wonder what Xi Jinping’s censorship of his own laughter has to do with them. The answer: everything. China’s strategy of information control is not limited to its borders. It is increasingly embedded in the global technology ecosystem that the United States relies on — from microchips and telecommunications to social media and artificial intelligence.
When China bans photos of its own president laughing, it is also signaling how far it will go to dictate what the world sees and knows about it. Beijing’s censorship model has already influenced how international corporations, universities, and entertainment industries operate. Hollywood self-censors to maintain access to the Chinese market. American tech firms face pressure to comply with Chinese data rules. Even some U.S. academic institutions have faced scrutiny for suppressing research that might anger Beijing.
Each of these compromises chips away at the same principle under attack in China: the freedom to document, to question, and to tell the truth without fear.
In a sense, the most revealing thing about the photos is not what they show but what their disappearance shows us. A regime that fears a smile is one that fears humanity itself. The Communist Party’s insistence on total image control betrays its greatest insecurity — that even the smallest glimpse of normalcy could undermine its myth of infallibility.
For the United States, this episode is a reminder that the threat from China is not only military or economic but informational. Beijing’s censorship system is the front line of a global campaign to redefine truth as state property. It is the model by which authoritarian power extends its reach — not through tanks or troops, but through algorithms and silence.
If Washington and the American public fail to recognize this, they risk waking up to a digital world where facts are negotiable, history is rewritten, and even a leader’s laughter can vanish at the stroke of a censor’s key. The battle for free expression begins not with grand speeches, but with the defense of the small, human moments that authoritarian systems most fear — a laugh, a photograph, a truth too genuine to control.