Xi’s Purge Reveals China’s Hidden Weakness — and Its Growing Danger to America
When China’s Defense Ministry announced the sudden expulsion of General He Weidong, the vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission and the second-highest-ranking officer in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it sent a shockwave through Beijing’s political elite. Alongside He, Admiral Miao Hua and seven other senior military officials were stripped of their Communist Party membership and military ranks on charges of “serious violations of Party discipline.” Officially, the move was part of another anticorruption campaign. In reality, it exposed something far more dangerous — a regime whose military command is so consumed by corruption, secrecy, and political fear that it cannot be trusted even by its own leader.
General He’s fall marks the first removal of a sitting vice chairman of the Central Military Commission since the Cultural Revolution — an extraordinary breach of internal hierarchy that underscores Xi Jinping’s personal insecurity about the loyalty of his generals. He, once considered a close ally of Xi and a key figure in China’s military modernization program, had not appeared in public since March. His disappearance, like many others before him, foreshadowed his political execution.
Admiral Miao, formerly head of the PLA’s Political Work Department, had already been placed under investigation in June. The two men, along with seven other high-ranking officers, were accused of “serious duty-related crimes involving an extremely large amount of money.” State media called their removal “a significant achievement in the Party’s anticorruption drive.” Yet observers in and outside China know that the timing — days before the Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee — reveals a deeper political purpose: to remind the military and the Party elite that Xi’s control is absolute and that any potential dissent, real or imagined, will be met with destruction.
Over the past decade, Xi Jinping’s anticorruption crusade has eliminated not only thousands of local officials but also the top brass of nearly every branch of the PLA. At least 70 generals have been investigated, detained, or disappeared since 2020 alone. The pattern is unmistakable: every few months, the Chinese leader removes another cluster of senior officers, usually just before a major Party meeting or national defense exercise.
To the outside world, this may look like routine political cleansing. But for the United States and its allies, these purges are flashing warning lights. They reveal that the same military Beijing claims is preparing to challenge the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific is deeply fractured, paranoid, and riddled with corruption. That instability is not a sign of weakness alone — it is a potential source of risk. A paranoid regime, fearful of internal betrayal, is often more prone to external aggression.
The current purge follows a wave of mysterious disappearances within China’s Rocket Force, the branch responsible for nuclear and ballistic missile operations. In 2023, the Rocket Force’s two top commanders vanished without explanation, later confirmed to have been detained under investigation. Their removal, coming amid rumors of embezzled missile funds and falsified readiness reports, sparked fears inside Chinese circles that the PLA’s nuclear deterrent had been compromised by graft and falsified data.
Western intelligence analysts interpreted those events as a sign that China’s rapid military modernization had outpaced its internal controls. If generals are lying to Beijing about missile performance or diverting funds from weapons programs, the risks extend far beyond China’s borders. A military apparatus that cannot verify its own capabilities may overestimate its readiness — and miscalculate in a crisis.
The PLA has always been more of a Party army than a national one. Loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) supersedes professional competence, and promotions depend on political alignment rather than battlefield skill. Xi Jinping’s purges have deepened that culture, replacing senior commanders with younger officers known less for military achievement than for personal allegiance.
That dynamic creates an unstable paradox. Xi’s tightening grip may reinforce his personal authority, but it also hollows out the institutional trust needed to run a modern fighting force. Senior officers now fear not foreign adversaries but internal denunciation. Middle-ranking commanders learn that initiative can be fatal. The result is a hierarchy paralyzed by politics, where everyone is watching everyone else — and no one dares tell the truth.
Such dysfunction would be troubling in any major power, but it is especially dangerous in a regime that publicly vows to “reunify” Taiwan by force if necessary. If Xi’s generals are too afraid to report logistical failures or operational weaknesses, Beijing could launch an invasion based on false confidence, dragging the region — and the world — into war.
Paradoxically, Xi’s purges are not just about cleaning up the system; they are about weaponizing fear. Each expulsion serves two purposes: to eliminate potential rivals and to signal to subordinates that the only safe path is blind obedience. This environment of enforced loyalty allows Xi to pursue risky policies — from militarizing the South China Sea to threatening Taiwan — without internal challenge.
For the United States, that presents a new strategic dilemma. A Chinese leadership consumed by purges and paranoia may act less predictably, compensating for internal fragility with external aggression. History shows that authoritarian regimes often resort to nationalism when domestic instability mounts. Every new scandal within the PLA increases Xi’s need for an external “victory” — a show of strength that distracts from weakness.
While the PLA’s internal disarray might seem like good news for Washington, it also heightens the danger of miscalculation and asymmetric warfare. When trust erodes inside a command structure, decisions become erratic. Lower-level commanders may interpret vague orders aggressively, and chain-of-command failures could escalate small incidents into crises.
For example, a nervous PLA Navy officer operating in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea might overreact to a U.S. patrol, believing that restraint could be seen as disloyalty. Similarly, PLA cyber units — operating under unclear directives — could launch preemptive attacks against U.S. infrastructure during political turbulence in Beijing.
In such a system, the most dangerous moment is not when China feels strong but when it feels cornered and uncertain. Xi Jinping’s current purge campaign suggests a leadership anxious about loyalty within its own ranks, yet determined to project external power to mask that fragility. That combination — insecurity coupled with ambition — is inherently volatile.
The United States should read Xi’s purges not as a sign of confidence but as evidence of decay inside China’s war machine. Washington’s response must be twofold: deterrence through strength, and resilience through transparency.
First, the U.S. must continue strengthening its alliances across the Indo-Pacific, ensuring that deterrence does not rest solely on America’s shoulders. Expanding intelligence cooperation with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and India will be vital to tracking changes inside the PLA and detecting early signs of instability.
Second, American policymakers must resist the temptation to underestimate Beijing. A corrupt or paranoid military can still be deadly if it lashes out under pressure. The challenge is to deter China without provoking it, maintaining open channels for crisis management even as the U.S. hardens its defenses.
Finally, Washington must communicate clearly with the American public about the evolving nature of China’s threat. This is not just an economic rivalry or a trade dispute — it is a confrontation with an authoritarian system that fuses military ambition, political repression, and organized deceit. Understanding that nexus is essential to defending both U.S. interests and democratic values worldwide.
For all his talk of “national rejuvenation,” Xi Jinping now presides over a system defined by fear. The disappearance of generals, the constant reshuffling of military ranks, and the obsessive secrecy surrounding the PLA’s internal affairs are not signs of confidence — they are signs of vulnerability. Xi’s China may look powerful from the outside, but its foundations are brittle.
That brittleness, however, does not make it harmless. It makes it unpredictable. As Xi consolidates power ahead of the Communist Party’s Fourth Plenum, every new purge tightens his control but erodes institutional stability. The danger for the United States is that an unstable autocracy armed with advanced weapons and global ambitions will seek to prove its strength through confrontation abroad.
America’s task is not to exploit China’s weakness but to prepare for its consequences. As history repeatedly shows, the most dangerous adversaries are not the confident ones — they are the insecure empires that mistake repression for stability and aggression for strength.
